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FALLOUT FROM CHAOULLI IS IT
TIME TO FIND COVER?©
JOAN M. GILMOUR*
This article examines the implications of the decision
in Chaoulli v. Quebec (A.G.) for Canadian health
policy. The author assesses whether governments are
likely to strengthen medicare, given past performance
and the exit option Chaoulli presents. The article
analyzes the consequences of increasing private care
and private insurance, concluding this will diminish the
publicly funded system. It contrasts Chaoulli -with
courts' dismissals of claims for Charter protection of
minimal social and economic security, despite the
profound effects of the latter on health status. It
concludes by noting Chaoulli is one more example of
the increasing prevalence of discourse normalizing
privatization and individual responsibility in policy
justifications.
Cet article examine les cons6quences qu'exercera le
jugement rendu dans 'affaire Chaoulli c. Quebec
(A.G.) sur la politique de sant6 canadienne. L'auteur
s'interroge pour savoir si les gouvernements sont
susceptibles de renforcer l'assurance sant6, 6tant
donn6 la performance pass6e et l'option de sortie que
pr6sente Chaoulli L'article analyse les cons6quences
d'une augmentation des soins priv6s et de l'assurance
priv6e, et conclut que cela affaiblira le syst~me que
financent les deniers publics. I1 oppose le jugement
Chaoulli aux d~bout~s que prononcent les tribunaux
dans les proc6dures relatives A la protection, aux
termes de la Charte, du minimum de s6curit6 sociale et
6conomique, malgr6 les effets profonds de ces
dernibres sur le statut de la sant6. Pour conclure,
'article note que l'affaire Chaoulli repr6sente un
nouvel exemple de la pr6dominance grandissante du
discours normalisant la privatisation et la
responsabilit6 individuelle, qui vise b justifier les
politiques.
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Chaoulli v. Quebec (AG)' is a troubling decision, both because
of the majority's problematic interpretation and application of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,2 and because of the impact
the decision will have on publicly funded health care. While there is
much to criticize in the majority's legal analysis, this article focuses on
an even greater concern: the implications of the decision for the future
of Canadian health policy. I begin by situating the decision in the
context of the Canadian health care system, outlining developments
since Chaoulli in law, politics, policy, and the professions, and then
consider how the decision is likely to affect the organization of the
health system and access to care. The prevailing focus on acute care in
health services and policy fails to take into account the important
influence of broader determinants of health on health status, especially
social, economic, and environmental factors that are often beyond
individual control. This omission is evident in law as well, in the
consistent rejection of legal challenges seeking to protect even minimal
economic and social supports when government action clearly harms the
health and well-being of vulnerable populations. I examine the marked
contrast between these cases and the Court's readiness in Chaoulli to
overturn government policy seen as negatively affecting the health and
well-being of a different population-those able to pay privately for
health care. I conclude by noting how Chaoulli demonstrates the
growing influence of discourse that normalizes privatization and self-
reliance in policy justifications.
I. SITUATING THE DECISION IN THE HEALTH CARE
LANDSCAPE
In order to assess what Chaoulli means for the future, it is
important to understand the broad outlines of the existing funding
arrangements and policy context in health care. The bulk of
constitutional jurisdiction over and responsibility for health care rests
with the provinces. While the federal government has some areas of
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 [Chaoulh].
2 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [Charter.
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direct responsibility, its power over health care is primarily indirect,
exercised largely through its spending power. At present, approximately
70 per cent of total health care expenditures in Canada are paid from
public funds, while the remaining 30 per cent are covered by the private
sector, a figure that has been increasing slowly for some time.' Of the
130 billion dollars spent on health care in 2004, public spending
accounted for 91 billion dollars; the remaining 39 billion dollars came
from private sources, split almost evenly between private insurance and
out of pocket spending.4 Canada funds hospital and physician services
almost entirely (98 per cent) through public monies,5 as well as First
Nations health care, public health programs, and part of the cost of
other services such as home care, extended care, prescription drugs, and
ambulances.6 Public expenditures on health care have been increasing
steadily in recent years, following an unprecedented five-year period of
decreases in the mid-1990s; indeed, they grew more rapidly in constant
dollars from 1998-1999 to 2003-2004 than at any time since 1975-1976. 7
Private expenditures on health care by insurers and individuals have
been growing even more rapidly than public expenditure.8 Most private
expenditures are for drugs, dental care, and vision care.9 Looking at
Canada in a comparative context, private sector funding accounts for
' Canadian Institute for Health Information, Exploring the 70/30 Split: How Canada's
Health Care System is Financed(Ottawa: Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2005), online:
<http://secure.cihi.ca/cihiweb/dispPage.jsp?cwpage=AR_1282_E&cw-topic=1282> at vii [CIHI,
70/30 Split]. In 1994, private expenditures accounted for 28 per cent of health spending (ibid. at 6).
4 Ibid. at 18-19. Canadians paid about $17 billion out of'pocket for health services in 2002
(ibid. at 7).
s Ibid. at 6.
6 Ibid. at 18-19. Among provincial and territorial governments, approximately 61 per cent
of health expenditures are allocated to programs associated with services covered by the Canada
Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6 [CILA]. For instance, hospitals account for 42.3 per cent and
physician services account for 19.6 per cent. A further 10.5 per cent goes to institutions other than
hospitals, 9.1 per cent to drugs, 5.8 per cent to public health, 1.8 per cent for administration, and 4.9
per cent to capital. See Canadian Institute for Health Information, "Preliminary Provincial and
Territorial Government Health Expenditure Estimates, 1974-1975 to 2005-2006" (November 2005),
online: <http://www.cihi.ca> at 19 [CIHI, "Health Expenditure Estimates"]. These percentages do
not include direct federal expenditures on health care.
' Ibid. at 2-3. The 2005-2006 forecast is approximately $2 per capita less than the amount
that would have been realized if the trend prior to 1993-1994 had continued without the five years
of decreases (ibid.).
8 CIHI, 70/30 Split, supra note 3 at vii.
' Ibid. at 19. Governments bear part of those costs indirectly, through tax revenues
foregone.
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between one-fifth and one-third of health expenditure in most OECD
countries."° With 30 per cent of health expenditures being private,
Canada falls within that range, although the mix of what is paid for
privately and the constraints on practice, practitioners, and patients
differ considerably among countries.
A majority of Canadian provinces prohibit duplicative private
insurance: private insurance for hospital and physician services that are
considered medically necessary and therefore, publicly funded.11 In
keeping with the requirements of the Canada Health Act, provinces
must cover these services under their public health insurance plans in
order to receive full federal cash transfers.12 Whether or not private
insurance is prohibited, provinces have generally adopted measures to
prevent subsidy of private practice by public plans. 3 In Chaoulh;
however, four of the seven judges concluded that Quebec's prohibition
on the purchase of private health insurance in circumstances where
needed health care services were -not available in reasonable time in the
publicly insured system breached the Quebec Charter of Human Rights
and Freedoms,4 three of the four also held that it breached section 7 of
the Charter.5 The three dissenting judges held that neither of the
Charters were breached by prohibiting private insurance for health
services that were publicly insured.
II. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE CHAOULLI
On application, the Supreme Court of Canada granted Quebec a
twelve-month stay before the judgment in Chaoulli will come into
effect. 6 That breathing room will allow the province and the rest of
Canada time to formulate their responses. Health care, policy and law
lO Ibid. at 4.
" Supra note 1 at 833, Deschamps J.
12 See CHA, supra note 6, s. 7.
" Colleen M. Flood & Tom Archibald, "The Illegality of Private Health Care in Canada"
(2001) 164 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 825.
'4 R.S.Q. c. C-12 [Quebec Charter.
/s Deschamps J. limited her decision to finding that the ban breached the Quebec Charter.
McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J., with Bastarache J. concurring, held that the ban on private
insurance breached s. 7 of the Charter and also concurred with Deschamps J.' judgment on the
Quebec Charter.
1 Chaoulli c. Quebec (Procureurgendra) (2005) 2005 Carswell Que 5795 (eC).
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have not stood still in the interim, however. This section reviews the
most germane developments.
A. Law
On the legal front, the court was soon faced with another
attempt to challenge the delivery and funding of health care in Cilinger
c. Ouebec (Procureur g~nra4. 17 In that case, the Quebec Court of
Appeal had rejected a class action against the provincial government,
while allowing it to proceed against hospitals, based on allegations of
breach of duty for failure to provide timely treatment for women
diagnosed with breast cancer.18 The court denied leave to appeal.
Elsewhere in Canada, in Jane Doe 1 v. Manitoba,9 the Manitoba Court
of Appeal overturned a summary judgment that required the provincial
government to pay for abortions in private clinics. The lower court had
held that limiting provincial health insurance coverage for abortions to
those performed in public hospitals breached women's Charter rights,.
since abortion, a medically necessary service, could not be accessed in a
timely manner in those facilities. The Court of Appeal concluded that
the matter was not appropriate for summary judgment, but rather, in
light of the complex and evolving Charter issues raised and their
significant policy implications, required a full trial to allow for
development of a more complete evidentiary record."0 Other lawsuits
attacking various aspects of the health care system are underway as well.
B. Politics
Moving from law to politics, the federal government continues
to vow that there will not be two-tier health care in Canada. Beyond
that, prior to the election call, it did little more than point to the 2004
Health Accord and accompanying 41.3 billion dollars in federal money
already earmarked for the provinces. In addition, efforts to ensure that
provinces develop wait-time benchmarks in five areas culminated in a
17 [20041 C.S.C.R. 582.
1' [2004] R.J.Q. 2943 (C.A.).
'9 [2005] M.J. No. 335 (C.A.), rev'g in part (2004), 248 D.L.R. (4th) 547 (Q.B.) [Jane Doe
20 Ibid.
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December 2005 announcement of national standards for maximum wait
times in those areas.2 Health care played a muted role in all parties'
election campaigns. For their part, provinces are considering their
options, although only Alberta greeted the decision with enthusiasm.
Quebec announced it would not respond to Chaoulli until after the
federal election.
C. Policy
Meanwhile, policy papers continue to proliferate, as they have
for years now. In Quebec, the Menard Commission Report on
improving Quebec's health care system, tabled in July 2005,
recommended increasing private sector involvement in health care (at
least in service delivery), introducing "loss of autonomy" insurance, and
tax increases to pay for medicare. 2 Alberta, having hailed the Chaoulli
decision, continues to flesh out a "Third Way" option to allow more
scope for private health care; with a federal election looming, however,
it became reticent about its plans.23 A focus on wait times characterized
much work in the non-government sector. Canadian Policy Research
Networks produced their second annual cross-Canada check-up on
provincial progress in developing uniform indicators of the need for
" Health Canada, News Release, "First Minister's Meeting on Future of Health Care
2004: A 10-year plan to strengthen health care" (16 September 2004), online: <http://www.hc-
sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/delivery-prestation/fptcollab/2004-fmm-rpm/indexe.html>. The 2004 Health
Accord includes commitments by First Ministers to have evidence-based benchmark wait times for
cancer, heart, diagnostic imaging procedures (MR/CT scans), joint replacements, and sight
restoration (cataracts) by 31 December 2005. Indications at the time of writing in late 2005 are that,
while there will be limited progress, the task will be far from complete. See Gloria Galloway "Deal
Set on Hospital Waiting Times" The Globe and Mail (24 October 2005) Al; Ken Pole, "The
Challenge of Wait Times" Medical Post 41:37 (1 November 2005), online:
<http://www.medicalpost.com/opinions/columns/article.jsp?content=20051031_195857_2488>. In
November 2005, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) released reports highlighting
the paucity of scientific evidence on which to base wait-time benchmarks for cancer, joint
replacements, and sight restoration. See CIHR, News Release, "CIHR Releases Research Results to
Inform the Development of Benchmarks for- Wait Times" (16 November 2005), online:
<http://www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/29902.html>. See also Karen Howlett & Caroline Alphonso "Targets
Set for Faster Health Care" The Globe andMail(13 December 2005) Al.
22 Peter Woodford, "Quebec and Alberta Tiptoe Towards Private Healthcare" (2005) 2:15
Nat'l. Rev. Med. 17 at 17.
2 "'Third Way' Legislation on Hold in Alberta" (2005) 9:41 Health Edition 4.
Fallout from Chaoulli
procedures and efforts to rationalize and reduce waiting lists. 24 The Wait
Time Alliance for Timely Access to Healthcare, an amalgam of national
medical specialty societies and the Canadian Medical Association,
released a report that, although acknowledging the lack of needed data,
nonetheless proposed specific wait-time benchmarks by priority level
and procedure in the five areas governments had targeted. It also
recommended that governments establish a Health Care Access Fund to
pay for care obtained elsewhere when provinces did not meet those
benchmarks, a suggestion that sparked its own round of critiques.26
D. Professions
Reaction to Chaoulli from health care providers' professional
organizations has been mixed. The Canadian Nurses Association urged
Canadian governments to resist pressures to allow more private sector
involvement and encouraged its members to advocate for the
sustainability of the publicly funded, not-for-profit health care system,
noting that despite the frustration of all involved, allowing more private
care "is a short-sighted decision that flies in the face of the evidence., 27
The Canadian Medical Association, however, lost little time in
endorsing an expanded role for privately funded health care services. At
its Annual General Meeting in August 2005, despite a pro forma nod to
supporting medicare with a resolution that access to care should be
based on need and not ability to pay, delegates voted by a margin of two
to one in favour of "the principle that when timely access to care cannot
be provided in the public system, the patient should be able to utilize
private health insurance to reimburse the cost of care obtained in the
24 Tom McIntosh, The Taming of the Queue IT" Wait Times Measurement, Monitoring
and Management (Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks, 2005), online: Canadian Policy
Research Networks <http://www.cprn.ca/en/doc.cfm?doc=1274> [CPRN, The Taming of the
Queue I].
5 Wait Time Alliance for Timely Access to Health Care, Its About Time! Achieving
Benchmarks and Best Practices in Wait Time Management (Ottawa: Canadian Medical
Association, 2005) at 3, 5 [Wait Time Alliance].
26 See e.g. Barbara Sibbald, "Benchmarks for 'scheduled' cases unwise, experts say" (2005)
173 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 742.
27 Deborah Tamlyn, "Message from the President" (2005) 101:8 Can. Nurse 12 at 12,
online: <http://cna-nurses.ca/CNA/documents/pdf/publications/AccessOct2005_e.pdf>.
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private sector. '28 They voted 198 to six to develop policy principles to
"define and guide the relationship between the public and private
sectors in delivery and funding of health care in Canada., 29 As Canadian
health economist Robert Evans has pointed out, privatizing health care
financing and delivery aligns with physicians' economic incentives:
The loud voices for privatization ... come from those who believe that they could do
better, in the form of increased sales or higher prices for their products or services, in a
more entrepeneurial environment. It is not clear how many, if any, of these would
support a truly private system, with no direct or indirect contribution of public funds....
Instead, what seems to be contemplated is a continuation of public support on a large
scale, but without limits on private fee setting or delivery, or private insurance-rather
like the United States, in fact, before "managed care."
30
These observations seem particularly salient to the Wait Time
Alliance proposal for a government-funded Health Care Access Fund
described earlier,3 since it would not be subject to the supply-side
controls on practitioners and services that provincial governments have
imposed as a way to constrain health care costs. They are also germane
to any assessment of care guarantees, promised during the election
campaign, that would provide financial support for patients to obtain
treatment in another jurisdiction when unavailable in their home
jurisdiction within a medically acceptable timeframe. They have the
potential to encourage increased privatization in service delivery, and
significantly decrease governments' ability to control the cost of services,
since they would be outside the fee schedules governments negotiate or
impose on providers and institutions. Evans notes that hospital workers,
on the other hand, "whose patients tend to be very ill and/or have very
limited resources" (and therefore, limited ability to pay privately), are
generally very supportive of public payment systems, although they resist
hospital downsizing or cost containment more generally, consistent with
an interest in maintaining or increasing their incomes, along with a
28 Matt Borsellino, "2005 CMA meeting was one for the ages" Medical Post 41:29 (6
September 2005) at 1.
29 Ibid. See also Sacha Bhatia & Adam Natsheh, "Should Canadian physicians support
parallel private health care?" (2005) 173:8 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 901.
0 Robert Evans, "Health reform: What 'business' is it of business?" in Daniel Drache &
Terry Sullivan, eds., Market Limits in Health Refornr. Public Success, Private Failure (London:
Routledge, 1999) 25 at 36 [Evans, "Health Reform"] [emphasis in original].
3 Supra note 25.
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concern for the delivery of effective and timely care.32 Clearly, economic
explanations alone are not sufficient. Health care workers are certainly
motivated by more than economic incentives-most notably, by concern
for patients. However, economic self-interest does play a role in the
health care policies particular groups advocate. The alignment between
economic incentives and providers' preferred policy solutions is properly
taken into account when evaluating the proposals they advance.
III. TAKING STOCK
I turn now to consider what Chaoulliwill mean for the future of
health care. Political scientist Carolyn Hughes Tuohy has pointed out
that, although stresses have become more evident, the Canadian health
care system overall has been characterized by "extraordinary structural
and institutional stability" for years, and that health policy development
has brought about only incremental alterations to the basic institutional
mix and structural balance.33 Chaoulli has the potential to alter that
pattern substantially. Questions about the directions in which Canadian
health policy will develop now abound. An immediately pressing one is
whether it is time for us all to find cover-private insurance cover?
The one prediction that can be made with certainty after
Chaoulli is that there will be more litigation. The Court- was evenly
divided on whether Quebec's prohibition of private insurance breached
the Charter, with Justice Deschamps expressing no opinion on that
issue. The standard propounded by Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice
Major,' joined by Justice Bastarache-health care of a reasonable
standard within a reasonable timeframe-provides a vague threshold at
best.34 How it will apply in different circumstances is far from self-
evident. Justice Deschamps' judgment carried the day, but she based her
decision only on the Quebec Charter. Although provincial health
insurance statutes are typically drafted with an eye to satisfying the
conditions in the CHA that provinces must meet to qualify for full
32 Evans, "Health Reform, "supra note 30.
3 Carolyn Hughes Tuohy, Accidental Logics. The Dynamics of Change in the Health Care
Arena in the United States, Britain, and Canada (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 204.
Tuohy summarizes at 33: "[T]he basic structure of Canada's 'internal market,' the balance between
public and private finance, and, most significantly, the influence of the medical profession and the
importance of collegial mechanisms of decision-making remain essentially unchanged."
4 Supra note 1 at 843-44.
2006]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
federal cash transfers, Chaoulli itself involved only a challenge to
Quebec legislation, and not to either the CHA or the provincial laws
preventing physicians from working in both the private and public
systems. Although all provinces limit private sector overlap with services
that are publicly insured, as Justice Deschamps noted in Chaoulli not
all do so in the same way, potentially raising different issues in different
jurisdictions." Apart from the issue of private health insurance, the
proliferation of private clinics in Canada had sparked lawsuits
attempting to force governments to crack down on alleged violations of
the CA and provincial legislation; these challenges will continue.36 The
British Columbia Nurses Union, for instance, had already begun legal
proceedings seeking to force the provincial government to enforce its
own health insurance legislation and prohibit private clinics from
charging patients for publicly insured services. Emboldened by Chaoull,
not only were a number of those clinics reportedly considering seeking
intervenor status to argue that patients' Charter rights override the
provincial legislation, and so, the practice should be allowed, but many
also have announced, ambitious plans to establish for-profit clinics across
Canada that would allow private payment regardless of public
coverage.37 Charter-based challenges to exclusions from provincial
health insurance plans will also continue, claiming not that patients
should be free to purchase services Or insurance privately, but rather
that more, or more timely, or more widely available services must be
covered under public health insurance plans, on the basis that both the
CHAi and patients' Charter rights are breached when provincial health
insurance fails to cover medically necessary services.38 In sum, we can
-- Ibid. at 831-33, Deschamps J.
3 See e.g. Canadian Union of Public Employees v. Canada (Ministerof Health) (2004),
244 D.L.R. (4th) 175 (F.C.T.D.).
" Elaine Carey "Private surgery in the city?" Toronto Star (3 December 2005) A24; Myron
Love, "Chaoulli in Action: Manitoba Private Clinic Buys its Own MRI, Challenging Governmental
Policy" Medical Post 41:41 (29 November 2005), online:
<http://www.medicalpost.com/news/aritcle.jsp?content=20051127_205836_4484>; and Matthew
Sylvain, "Private Options Coming East" Medical Post 42:3 (24 January 2006), online:
<http://www.medicalp'ost.com/news/article.jsp?content= 20060123205722_4776>.
38 See e.g. Jane Doe 1, supra note 16; Lisa Priest "Transplant Patient to Invoke Charter"
The Globe and Mail (7 December 2005) A17 (Charter challenge to Ontario's refusal to pay for
out-of-country liver transplant for a cancer patient); and Ingrid Peritz "Morgentaler Lashes out at
Tories on Abortion" The Globe and Mail (17 January 2006) A8 (class action suit in Quebec
challenging its decision to only partially cover fees for abortions in private clinics).
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anticipate (and indeed, are already seeing) many lawsuits about what
Chaoulli means, its application in the rest of Canada, and its
implications for expanding public health insurance.
IV. HEALTH POLICY: THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME
Beyond more litigation, Chaoulli may herald an end to
provincial governments' monopsony power as single payer for most
hospital and physician services, as well as a beginning to private
insurance that duplicates public system coverage. Will it provide the
impetus for radical change to the Canadian health care system, or can
the publicly funded system be reinforced and Chaoulli accommodated
without such a major break? The answer will depend on political will. In
broad terms, the response may take one of three directions: resistance,
acquiescence, or welcome. Examining and assessing policy
developments and government initiatives in the past can assist in
predicting future directions. To date, with the exception of Alberta,
governments' rhetoric across Canada would certainly indicate that they
intend to reinvigorate the publicly funded system. Will that be the
reality? Given past government performance, the answer is not as clear
as the fervent avowals of support for the public system might lead one to
believe.
Since the passage of the CHA, the federal government has never
withheld cash transfers to any provincial government because it was
failing to comply with the act's five conditions to qualify for full federal
cash transfers-portability, accessibility, universality, comprehensive-
ness, and public administration-although it has done so on occasion
when provinces have permitted extra billing or user fees.39 That would
not be problematic if provinces were complying with those five statutory
requirements. However, blanket assertions of adherence to the CHA are
difficult to credit due to long-standing troubling practices. These include
Quebec's refusal to pay out-of-province physicians in accordance with
their home province pay scales (contrary to the requirements of
portability), numerous allegations of charging privately for services
covered by public insurance, and providing quick access to services for
9 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, "Health Canada: Federal Support of Health
Care Delivery" in 2002 Status Report,. c.3, online: 2002 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada
<http:// www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20020903ce.html>.
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private payment (challenging comprehensiveness and universality), and
a long list of others. Even so, federal inaction on cash transfers would
not be problematic if breaches were being resolved and compliance
ensured as a result of negotiations between the federal government and
the province concerned. But that has not occurred either.4" Why is this?
The federal Auditor General reported in 2002 that Health Canada was
reluctant to pursue suspected non-compliance vigorously, in part out of
a concern that provinces will simply choose to absorb the cost of
penalties imposed." Reluctance to disrupt federal-provincial relations
must also play a major role. With this record, there is good reason to
doubt the federal commitment to protecting and upholding the publicly
funded health care system and the terms of the C-A in practice.
What of the provinces? Despite statements strongly supporting
single-tier health care provided on the basis of need and not ability to
pay, the possibilities opened by Chaoulli have to be sorely tempting.
Governments are faced with rising health care costs and demands to
provide a constantly expanding array of services, technologies, and
drugs. Robert Evans has argued clearly and persuasively for years that
the least demanding response for those with the responsibility to pay
rising health care costs, like governments, is not to contain them (a
politically unpopular move, not only with patients, but also with
providers who derive their income from services rendered), but to
transfer those costs to other payers, be they individuals or private
insurers.42 By doing so, governments avoid the painful political fallout
from "denying" care and can reduce their own health care costs. Health
care costs overall, however, are not reduced, and in fact, are quite likely
to increase, both because of the cost of paying for multiple plan
"administrations," and because the bargaining power of a single payer
40 There were indications of a willingness to act on this front in mid-2005 when the federal
government and New Brunswick appeared set to take their disagreement over whether the
province's refusal to fund abortions in private clinics breached the CIA to a dispute resolution
panel under the Social Union Framework Agreement. However, no panel had been appointed by
the time the federal election was called, and the new Conservative government has not yet
responded to queries about whether it will continue to press that issue. See Richard Rolk "Tories
Don't Know if They'll Force Province to Pay for Abortions at Morgentaler Clinic" New Brunswick
Telegraph-Journal(17 January 2006) A4, cited in "News Shorts" (2006) 10:3 Health Edition 3 at 3.
41 Supra note 39 at 9-12.
42 "Tension, Compression and Shear: Directions, Stresses and Outcomes of Health Care
Cost Control" (1990) 15 J. Health Pol. 101.
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will have been lost.43 Even before Chaoulli provincial governments had
undertaken a number of initiatives to limit the services for which they
were responsible, and to shift costs to private sources. Examples include
de-listing services from public health insurance plans, discharging
patients from hospitals to home "sooner and sicker" with responsibility
to pay for their own drugs and other care, and encouraging private
clinics that provide both insured and uninsured services with blurred
distinctions between the two.44 In Alberta, private clinics are permitted
to package "enhanced" services that patients can purchase as
alternatives or additions to those publicly funded. It recently ended
many of the restrictions on what procedures private clinics can perform
and how much they can charge for uninsured services, doing away with
much of the regulatory oversight. Governments are also increasingly
reluctant to expand public health insurance by adding new services.
Shifting responsibility for health services and costs out of the
public realm will have significant effects. Many of these have been
catalogued and analyzed extensively elsewhere; what follows is a brief
summary of the most salient.46 First, as explained previously, without
the discipline of a single payer and administration, overall health care
costs will increase. Second, those who pay privately for diagnostic
services will "queue jump" back into the public system, with the result
that ability to pay (in the private system) will be a factor affecting access
to services (in the public system). Third, limited personnel will be drawn
4 Ibid.; Robert Evans, "Preserving Privilege, Promoting Profit: The Payoffs from Private
Health Insurance" in Colleen Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, eds., Access to Care, Access to
Justice: The Legal Debate Over Private Health Insurance in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2005) 347 at 361-65 [Evans, "Preserving Privilege"].
' Joan Gilmour, "Regulation of Free-Standing Health Facilities: An Entr6e for
Privatization and For-Profit Delivery in Health Care" [2003] Health L.J. (Special Ed.) 131 at 138-
39.
' "Critics say province has removed restrictions on private clinics" CBC Edmonton (20
July 2005), online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/edmonton/story/ed-health-klein20050720.html>.
Prior to a recent provincial Order-in-Council, enhanced services (for which patients pay privately)
were covered by Schedule 2 of the Health Care Protection Act, which provided that procedures had
to be government-approved and limited -profit margins (ibid.).
4 See Joan Gilmour, "Creeping Privatization in Health Care: Implications for Women as
the State Redraws Its Role" in Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge, eds., Privatization, Law and the
Challenge to Feminism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 267 at 284-86, and references
cited therein [Gilmour, "Creeping Privatization"]; Robert Evans eta]., Private Highway, One Way
Street. The Deklein and Fall of Canadian Medicare (Vancouver: University of British Columbia
Centre for Health Services and Policy Research, 2000).
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to work in the private sector where fees charged are not subject to
government control or caps. Patients in the public system will be left
waiting longer for the fewer and less available personnel. Fourth, private
clinics can be expected to "cream skim" both more lucrative procedures
and lower cost, less complicated patients. If complications result from
private treatment, patients will be sent back to publicly funded facilities
for treatment at public expense. Fifth, practitioners, hoping to attract
clients to pay more privately for services that are also publicly funded,
will have little incentive to ensure that patients can readily access
services of high quality through the public system; in fact, quite the
opposite will occur. It will be in their interests if the public system is, or
appears to be, slow or otherwise inferior in quality. Sixth, governments'
and health administrators' -ability to manage caseload and direct
resources, including personnel, to particular types of care will be
weakened. Private clinics and care will concentrate on what people who
can pay want, and that will most easily provide a high return to
providers-hip replacements, executive physicals and gold-plated family
practice, MRIs (whether medically necessary or simply to assuage the
concerns of the "worried well"), and so on. They will not focus on more
complex, chronic, or less lucrative care, such as attending to the
treatment needs of older people who are failing, suffering from
pneumonia, heart failure, and strokes.
Depending on how widely its invitation to privatization is read,
Chaoulli has the potential to accelerate these developments. The result
will be more limited availability of publicly funded services and a public
health care system diminished on a number of fronts. However, in
Chaoull4 Chief Justice McLachlin et al. concluded that ending the ban
on duplicative private insurance would "permit ordinary Canadians to
access health care in circumstances where the government is failing to
deliver."47 That result is far from assured. Recall the issue in Chaouli.
access to private health insurance. Insurance plans provide a pre-set
package of coverage and services at a price and subject to conditions of
eligibility that an insurance company offers. Even though private health
insurance can be controlled to a greater or lesser extent by regulation, as
it is in other jurisdictions (for instance, requiring community rather than
individual risk ratings), the "faster access to better health care services"
" Supra note 1 at 850, McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J.
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that it is supposed to offer will be limited. First, it will be limited to
those who can pay for it. In Chaoulh; Justice Deschamps acknowledges
this forthrightly: "the question is whether Quebeckers who are prepared
to spend money to get access to health care that is, in practice, not
accessible in the public sector because of waiting lists may be validly
prevented from doing so by the state."4 Many will not be able to afford
it. Second, there will be individuals whose pre-existing health conditions
are sufficiently serious that they are not a good business risk for
insurance companies. They may be precluded from obtaining private
health insurance. These two factors are interrelated. Systems with a
large private financing component are highly regressive, requiring
people at lower incomes to contribute a larger share of their incomes.49
As Evans has pointed out, this result is magnified because needs for care
are consistently inversely correlated with income: that is, the wealthy are
healthier, and need and use fewer services." This observation applies to
private health insurance too: premiums reflect individuals' risk status
(their expected use and cost of care), and will tend to be higher-
requiring a higher percentage of income-in lower income classes. Both
these factors mean that for many ordinary people private health
insurance will not be a realistic possibility. One will either need to be
wealthy and healthy enough to qualify, or the insurance market will have
to be heavily regulated.
If duplicative private health insurance is allowed, most who
obtain it will do so through employment, as is presently the case with
extended health benefits plans.5 Realistically, what is included in the
package of insured services will be the choice of the employer, not of the
individuals." Plans are likely to include services particularly popular
with baby boomers and highlighted in the media, such as knee and hip
replacements, and MRIs. However, as Jonathan Oberlander has
4, Ibid. at 806-07.
4 This result is not so marked if private insurance is just a "top-up" to a well-functioning
and extensive public system, because then fewer poor people buy private insurance (Evans, "Health
Reform," supra note 30 at 33).
s Evans, "Preserving Privilege," supra note 43 at 355; Evans, "Health Reform," supra note
30 at 32.
' CIHI, 70/30 Split, supra note 3 at 7. This is consistent with other OECD countries surveyed
that have significant levels of private health insurance.
52 While theoretically open to negotiation between employer and employee, in practice
that is not likely to occur outside a unionized environment or with very senior levels of employee.
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observed in commenting on the situation in the United States, where
private health insurance already plays a major role in funding health
care, American employers "are much more likely to select insurance on
the basis of price than on the basis of quality."53 The much-vaunted
ability to control one's own health care that is said to come with private
health insurance 54 will not be controlled by the choices of the individual,
but rather of the employer, and it will not be particularly free or
unfettered, but highly price-dependent. Also, the availability of private
insurance will not end conflicts over whether health care services are
"medically necessary" or not, or "experimental" and unfunded or not.
One look at the many lawsuits in the United States challenging refusals
of coverage by managed care plans and health insurers shows that
decisions about private coverage will be contentious as well. Private
health insurance is not a panacea.
The preceding section has traced one possible set of responses in
the aftermath of Chaoulli-essentially, a continuation and
intensification of governments' efforts to shift responsibility for the cost
and provision of health care to others. There are other approaches
governments could take that would evince a genuine commitment to
preserving and strengthening the public system, and trying to preserve
equity and fairness in the provision of health care. There are real and
serious problems with unmet need and under-capacity that need to be
addressed. Avenues to explore include identifying, developing and
disseminating best practices in wait-time management and service
delivery;55 re-organizing health service delivery to optimize use of
existing resources and personnel, unfettered by restrictions on scope of
practice and workplace organization determined to be unnecessary;5 6
carefully controlling the rise of private clinics to ensure services
-3 "The US Health Care System: Road to Nowhere?" (2002) 167 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 163
at 167.
s See e.g. Chaoulh4 supra note 1 at 850, McLachlin C.J.C. and Major I.
ss Candidates include Ontario's consolidated list for cardiac care, Saskatchewan's
management of surgical wait-lists, and the Western Canada Waiting List project. See CPRN, The
Taming of the Oueue II, supra note 24.
56 Relative to personnel, greater and better use could be made of nurse practitioners and
physician assistants; relative to workplace organization, Alberta recently reported success in
reducing wait times for hip and knee replacements by streamlining assessment processes and
dedicating surgical facilities and funds to those procedures. See Dawn Walton "Alberta Slashes
Wait Times on Some Surgeries" The Globe andMail (20 December 2005) Al.
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provided are publicly funded and meet needs identified in and by the
public system; and finally-the most intractable problem-determining
how to decide what should and should not be publicly funded.57 All are
important to providing quality care in the public system.
V. BROADER DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH
The focus on acute medical care militated not just by the facts
that gave rise to Chaoulli but by the gravity and immediacy of many
acute medical problems, coupled with the structure of medicare,
squeezes out consideration of the effects of broader determinants of
health and the importance of working to ameliorate the conditions that
cause poor health. Social, economic, and environmental factors affect
health status profoundly.58 Research has established that not just
absolute disparities, but especially, the scale of relative income
inequities and social and economic differences within a society are very
significant determinants of population health. 9 Even with relatively
comprehensive insured medical and hospital services having been in
place for decades, there is a stubbornly persistent "health gap" between
rich and poor: well-off Canadians live longer and healthier lives than
low-income Canadians.
'z This would require assessment both of how decisions about new services should be made
and of whether existing coverage should be continued. As Timothy Caulfield points out, coverage
decisions initially reflected existing lists of services physicians provided, and then in the
expansionary economic climate of the times, were expanded to include what physicians requested:
"Wishful Thinking: Defining 'Medically Necessary' in Canada" (1996) 4 Health L.J. 63.
58 Canada, The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology,
The Health of Canadians- The Federal Role: Final Report, vol. 6, part VI "Health Promotion and
Disease Prevention," chapter 13, "Healthy Public Policy: Health Beyond Health Care" (Ottawa:
Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Techonology, 2002) at 239-40 (Chair:
Michael L. Kirby) [Kirby Reporj. The report notes that, while the health care system is clearly an
important contributor to good health, the estimated impact of the health care system on the health
status of the population is 25 per cent:
The remaining 75% of the health of the Canadian population is determined by a
multiplicity of factors outside the health care system. These ... include: biology and genetic
endowment; income and social support; education and literacy; employment and working
conditions; physical environment; personal health practices and skills; early childhood
development; gender; and culture.
I9 See e.g. Richard Wilkinson, Unhealthy Societies- The Afflictions of Inequality (London:
Routledge, 1996); Federal, Provincial and Territorial Advisory Committee on Population Health,
Toward a Healthy Future- Second Report on the Health of Canadians (Ottawa: Health Canada,
1999) at 184-85.
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Despite having accepted the accuracy of this observation and
having committed to reducing inequities in society for some time,
governments have not translated that commitment into action. Rather,
government policy has in many instances worsened economic and social
insecurity and inequality. As Joan Gilmour and Dianne Martin note:
Far from reflecting the clear identification of reduced access' to social and economic
resources for those least well off as having a significant negative effect on health status,
the changes [governments] actually implemented for the most part have been consonant
with a government agenda of restructuring and privatization. Through these processes,
governments have drastically reduced their economic role, cutting back on social
spending and increasingly promoting private self-reliance.
6
0
To see evidence of this, one need only consider the 20 per cent
reduction in welfare rates in Ontario in the mid-1990s, or the Quebec
government's welfare reform initiative that reduced benefits people
under the age of thirty could receive from 424 dollars per month to 173
dollars per month if they did not participate in job training programs.
Both these decisions were challenged in court. In Masse v. Ontario
(Ministry of Community and Social Services), the court declined to
inquire into what it termed a "policy/political" decision in any
substantive way, stating: "the intractable economic, social and even
philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs
are not the business of the Court."6 The Quebec decision Gosselin v.
Ouebec (Attorney General)6" was appealed to the Supreme Court of
Canada. It held that there was no breach of individuals' rights to life,
liberty, and security of the person, and no breach of equality rights when
the state reduced welfare payments to levels grossly inadequate to
support life.63 In both these cases, courts declined to interfere with the
government action, essentially holding that whether welfare recipients
received sufficient support to survive or not was a policy decision for
governments to take. The contrast with Chaoulliis striking. In that case,
0 "Women's Poverty, Women's Health: The Role of Access to Justice" in Penny Van
Esterik, ed., Head, Heart, and Hand. Partnerships for Women's Health in Canadian Environments,
vol. 1 (Toronto: National Network on Environments and Women's Health, 2003) 353 at 358.
6; Dandridge v. Williams (1970), 90 S. Ct. 1153 at 1163, cited in Masse v. Ontario (Ministry
of Community and Social Services) (1996), 134 D.L.R. (4th) 20 at 42 (Ont. Gen. Div.), O'Driscoll
J., leave to appeal refused, [1996] O.J. No. 1526 (C.A.) (QL).
62 [1999] R.J.Q. 1033 (C.A.).
63 [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429.
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the majority saw no difficulty in overturning the government's policy
choice. Finding that the prohibition against private health insurance
resulted in "psychological and emotional stress and a loss of control by
an individual over her own health,"64 a "difficulty" that met the
threshold requirement that it be "serious," Chief Justice McLachlin, and
Justices Major and Bastarache held that it breached section 7 of the
Charter, and hence, it could not stand.65
Effective action to improve the broader determinants of health
is important, not just to the future of the health care system, but to our
future health. It is a tremendously difficult challenge. As the Kirby
Report pointed out, "Despite the available evidence, no jurisdiction in
Canada and no country in the world has designed and implemented
programs and policies firmly based on a population health approach.,
66
Practical obstacles include the difficulty in associating cause and effect
because of the multiplicity of factors that influence health status (often
over long periods of time), the resulting lack of short-term political gain
that would make action more attractive to politicians, and the difficulty
of coordinating activities across many levels of government and areas
that influence health status. Additionally, the commitments needed
extend beyond government to non-government entities and individuals.
However, acknowledging that the goal is difficult to achieve does not
excuse inaction, or worse yet, regressive policies. Even without a
complete picture of all the factors that affect population health status
and how they interact, we do know with certainty that people who are
poor on the whole live shorter lives and suffer a disproportionate share
of illnesses and disabilities. We have the ability to provide a measure of
real economic and social security to all Canadians and to ameliorate the
conditions of their lives. Preserving access to a comprehensive range of
health services that are publicly insured is one crucial component to
preventing the health of those already most disadvantaged in society
from deteriorating even further. This is threatened by introducing
private parallel health insurance. However, access to health service
alone is not enough to address the health gap between those who are
better off and worse off in society. We also need to tackle the social and
"4 Supra note 1 at 850.
65 Ibid.
66 Supra note 58 at 251.
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economic conditions that significantly contribute to ill health.
Unfortunately, as this brief review of the law makes clear, legal
challenges attempting to force governments to do so, in even minimal
ways, have had little success.
VI. CONCLUSION
Returning to Chaoulli the decision has the potential to
accelerate the privatization in health care that is already underway.
Governments now have to make a fundamental decision about how far
they will use the decision to shift not only their responsibility to pay for
health care costs to others, but also, to shift the fallout-the blame for
ending single payer health care and the diminished public health care
system that will ensue-onto the Court. Early indications from Quebec,
the target of the litigation, are that the provincial government may allow
private insurance considerable scope.67 So alarming have its initial
pronouncements been that they prompted a quick collective response
from a number of Quebec legal experts pointing out that such extensive
changes would go significantly beyond what Chaoulli requires, especially
if they include physicians who have not opted out of the public system.68
Public discourse in Canada has long been strongly supportive of
our health care system, with its assurance that access to insured services
is based on need, and not on ability to pay. However, in recent years a
contrary discourse has arisen, emphasizing individual choice about and
responsibility for the health care services one uses and for one's own
health status. This has been coupled with claims that the health care
system is too expensive to be sustainable. These themes of
unaffordability and individual responsibility are relied on to justify
shifting costs from the public to the private realm.69 That discourse,
which presents increasing privatization as the only sensible policy
choice, flies in the face of the understanding that has long marked
Canadian society: that in important ways, health care is a collective
responsibility, and that efforts to reform the system should be directed
67 Rh~al Sguin "Quebec Moves Ahead on Plans for Private Health Insurance" The Globe
and Mail(11 November 2005) A9.
' Henri Brun etal "Privatisation des soins de sant6 au Qu6bec: I1 n'y a pas d"ordre' de la
Cour supreme" Le Devoir(17 November 2005) A7.
69 See generally Gilmour, "Creeping Privatization," supra note 46 at 267-68.
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to initiatives that benefit all Canadians. It is strengthened by continual
media reports that foster a climate of fear about the health system's
capacity to meet people's needs. These are powerful forces to resist.
Rallying to make the case for publicly funded health care is essential.
Governments' support for medicare will be strongly affected by the
public reaction they anticipate to their policy choices. In light of the
disappointing response from the Court in Chaouli4 mobilizing political
pressure is critical.

